Reusable Multi-Stage Multi-Secret Sharing Schemes Based on CRT by Anjaneyulu Endurthi et al.
Reusable Multi-Stage Multi-Secret Sharing Schemes
Based on CRT
Anjaneyulu Endurthi, Oinam Bidyapati Chanu, Appala Naidu Tentu, and V. Ch. Venkaiah
Abstract—Three secret sharing schemes that use the Mignotte’s
sequence and two secret sharing schemes that use the Asmuth-
Bloom sequence are proposed in this paper. All these five secret
sharing schemes are based on Chinese Remainder Theorem
(CRT) [8]. The first scheme that uses the Mignotte’s sequence is
a single secret scheme; the second one is an extension of the first
one to Multi-secret sharing scheme. The third scheme is again
for the case of multi-secrets but it is an improvement over the
second scheme in the sense that it reduces the number of public
values. The first scheme that uses the Asmuth-Bloom sequence
is designed for the case of a single secret and the second one is
an extension of the first scheme to the case of multi-secrets.
Novelty of the proposed schemes is that the shares of the
participants are reusable i.e. same shares are applicable even
with a new secret. Also only one share needs to be kept by
each participant even for the muslti-secret sharing scheme.
Further, the schemes are capable of verifying the honesty of the
participants including the dealer. Correctness of the proposed
schemes is discussed and show that the proposed schemes are
computationally secure.
Index Terms—Multi-Secret, Mignotte’s sequence, Asmuth-
Bloom sequence, CRT, Secret sharing scheme
I. INTRODUCTION
The requirement of the key being secret brings several
problems. Storing a secret key with only one person or server
or database reduces the security of the system to the security
and credibility of that agent. Besides, not having a backup of
the key introduces the problem of losing the key if a mischief
occurs. On the other hand, if the key is held by more than one
agent an adversary with a desire for the key has more flexibility
of choosing the target. Hence the security is reduced to the
security of the least secure or least credible of these agents.
Secret sharing schemes are introduced to solve these problems
of key management. The main idea of these schemes is to share
a secret among a set of agents such that only the predefined
coalitions can come together and reveal the secret, while no
other coalition can obtain any information about the secret.
Thus, the keys used in areas requiring vital secrecy like large-
scale finance applications and command control mechanisms
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of nuclear systems, can be stored by using secret sharing
schemes.
Secret sharing was first proposed by Blakley[3] and
Shamir[4]. The scheme by Shamir relies on the standard
Lagrange polynomial interpolation, whereas the scheme by
Blakley[3] is based on the geometric idea that uses the concept
of intersecting hyperplanes.
The family of authorized subsets is known as the access
structure. An access structure is said to be monotone if
a set is qualified then its superset must also be qualified.
Several access structures are proposed in the literature. They
include the (t, n)-threshold access structure, the Generalized
access structure and the Multipartite access structure. In the
(t, n)-threshold access structure there are n shareholders. An
authorized group consists of any t or more participants and
any group of at most t − 1 participants is an unauthorized
group. Let U be a set of n participants and let 2U be its power
set. Then the ’Generalized access structure’ refers to situations
where the collection of permissible subsets of U may be any
collection Γ ⊆ 2U having the monotonicity property.
In multipartite access structures, the set of players U is
partitioned into m disjoint entities U1,U2, · · · ,Um called
levels and all players in each level play exactly the same role
inside the access structure.
In multi-secret sharing schemes the problem of sharing
many secrets is addressed. In these schemes, every participant
needs to keep only one shadow and many secrets can be
shared independently without refreshing the shadow. In order
to reconstruct a secret, each involved participant only needs
to submit a pseudo shadow computed from the real shadow
instead of the real shadow itself. The reconstruction of a secret
cannot compromise the secrecy of the remaining secrets that
haven’t been reconstructed. A typical scenario wherein the
multi-secret sharing problem occurs is as follows.
Suppose that a company has l secrets which are important
for business functionalities. Each secret contains a key
information needed to perform a business operation. The
company does not trust any single employee to access any one
of the secrets. The company decides that each secret be shared
among a set of employees/participants according to a specific
threshold access structure. The company may use multiple
secret sharing schemes to share these secrets. Howevereach
employee needs to keep multiple shadows to participate in
each game of secret sharing corresponding to each secret.
So, there will be a shadow/share management problem in
this method. Hence the need for multi-secret sharing schemes.
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A. Detection of cheaters
A verifiable secret-sharing scheme [13] provides its share-
holders with an ability to verify that (a) the secret shadows
obtained from the dealer are derived consistently from the
same secret and (b) the secret shadows obtained from the
other shareholder in the secret reconstruction process are
genuine shadows. This ability is important because a dishonest
dealer can cheat share holders by giving them fake shadows.
Also communication errors can result in fake shadows. A
shareholder may also cheat others in the secret reconstruction
process by presenting a fake shadow to prevent others from
obtaining the real secret. Secret sharing schemes involving
cheaters is discussed in [5] and Cheating detection and iden-
tification in CRT based schemes was presented by pasaila [7].
B. Related Work
Secret sharing scheme that uses Mignotte’s sequence and
is based on Chinese Remainder Theorem [8] is introduced in
[1], and it is modified to result in another scheme by Asmuth-
Bloom [2]. J. He, E. Dawson [9], proposed a multi-stage secret
sharing scheme based on one way function in 1994 [10], [11],
[12]. They used Lagrange interpolation polynomial in order
to perform secret sharing. Later in 2000, Chien et al. [15]
proposed a new type of (t, n) multi-secret sharing scheme
based on the systematic block codes. Subba Rao Y V and
Chakravarthy Bhagvati [14] came up with a multi-stage secret
sharing scheme based on CRT. In the later scheme multiple
secrets are shared to different groups, such that each group
receives a share of the secret intended for it.
C. Motivation
Mignotte’s and Asmuth-Bloom Secret Sharing Schemes are
based on CRT. They are designed to handle single secret
only and hence they are not capable of handling multiple
secrets. So, to share multiple secrets, one needs to initiate
multiple (one for each secret) secret sharing schemes. Also
the shares distributed in connection with (corresponding to)
one secret cannot be reused for a different secret. That is
shares need to be distributed whenever a new secret is to be
shared. This results in receiving a participant to keep multiple
shares corresponding to each secret. So, there will be a share
management problem. This paper addresses this aspect of the
secret sharing schemes and proposes several schemes that
overcome this issue.
The paper is organised as follows: The following sub-
sections gives an overview of Mignotte and Asmuth-Bloom
schemes. Section 2 gives an overview of the Mignotte’s and
Asmuth-Bloom Schemes. Section 3 and 4 propose Mignotte’s
sequence based reusable secret sharing schemes designed for
single and multiple secrets respectively. Section 5 improves
on the multi-secret Sharing Scheme given in Section 4 by
reducing the number of public values required. Sections 6
and 7 propose Asmuth-Bloom sequence based reusable secret
sharing schemes designed for single and multiple secrets re-
spectively. Our results are shown in section 8 and Concluding
remarks are in section 9.
II. EXISTING SCHEMES
A. Overview of Mignotte’s SSS
Mignotte’s sequence: Let t and n be two integers such
that n ≥ 2 and 2 ≤ t ≤ n. A (t, n) Mignotte’s sequence is
a sequence of pairwise co-prime positive integers p1 < p2 <







This can be seen to be equivalent to
max1≤i1<...<it−1≤n(pi1 ∗ pi2 ∗ . . . ∗ pit−1 ) <
min1≤i1<...<it≤n(pi1 ∗ pi2 ∗ . . . ∗ pit)
To share a secret S among a group of n users, the dealer
does the following:
1) Distribution:
• The secret S is chosen as a random integer such that








• Compute shares Ii = S mod pi for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
• Distribute shares Ii, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, to n participants.
2) Reconstruction:
• Given t distinct shares Ii1Ii2 , . . . , Iit the secret S is
reconstructed using the standard variant of Chinese
Remainder Theorem, as the unique solution modulo
pi1 . . . pit of the system,
S ≡ Iij mod pij , 1 ≤ j ≤ t
B. Overview of Asmuth-Bloom SSS
A sequence of pairwise coprime positive integers (can also









To share a secret S among a group of n users, the dealer
does the following:
Distribution:
• The secret S is chosen as a random integer of the
set Zp0 .
• Compute shares Ii = X = (S + γp0) mod pi for










• Distribute shares Ii, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, to participants.
Reconstruction:
• Given t distinct shares Ii1Ii2 , . . . , Iit the modified
secret X is reconstructed using the standard vari-
ant of Chinese Remainder Theorem, as the unique
solution modulo pi1 . . . pit of the system
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X ≡ Iij mod pij , 1 ≤ j ≤ t
• The original secret can be reconstructed using S =
X mod p0
C. Two-variable one-way function
A two-variable one-way function F (r, z) is a function that
maps a random value r and a share z onto a bit string F (r, z)
of a fixed length. This function has the following properties.
• Given r and z, it is easy to compute F (r, z);
• Given z and F (r, z), it is hard to compute r;
• Having no knowledge of z, it is hard to compute F (r, z)
for any r;
• Given z, it is hard to find two different values r1 and r2
such that F (r1, z) = F (r2, z);
• Given r and F (r, z), it is hard to compute z;
• Given pairs of ri and F (ri, z), it is hard to compute
F (r′, z) for r′ 6= ri.
III. REUSABLE SINGLE SECRET SCHEME BASED ON
MIGNOTTE’S SEQUENCE
In the previous schemes i.e Mignotte [1], Asmuth-Bloom
[2], the shares are directly related to the secret. That is a new
set of shares needs to be distributed whenever a new secret
is to be shared. So, we hereby propose a scheme [6] that
overcomes this limitation; thereby allowing the shares to be
reusable.
Overview of the scheme
Initially, the dealer comes up with the number of partici-
pants, (n), threshold value, (k), the secret (S) to be shared
among the participants P1, P2, · · · , Pn, one way function,
(f) and the Mignotte’s sequence p1, p2, · · · , pn to be used.
Also the delaer chooses random values yi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and
distributes them one each to the participants (i.e yi to Pi) as
the pseduo shares of the participants. The dealer then computes
the (real) shares (Zi) of the participants Pi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
from the secret. Now the dealer applies the chosen one-way
function f to each of these random numbers (yi), subtracts
each of these resulting numbers f(yi) from the corresponding
real shares Zi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, of the participants. These values are
made public. While reconstructing the secret, the participants
first apply one-way function to the pseudo share, which they
possess, adds the resulting value f(yi) to the corresponding
public share and recovers the actual share Zi. These shares
are then used to recover the secret using CRT.
A. Distribution
• Dealer chooses a publicly known (k, n) Mignotte’s se-
quece p1, p2, . . . , pn
• Chooses randomly y1, y2, · · · , yn such that yi ∈ Zpi as
the pseudo share of the ith participant.
• Chooses the secret S such that β < S < α, where α =
k∏
i=1




• Computes Zi = S mod pi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
• Computes di = (Zi − f(yi)) mod pi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, as the
shift values, where f is the chosen one way function.
• For every i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, deliver yi to the i
th participant
through a secure channel and publish di
B. Reconstruction
• Each particiapnt calculates his actual share by computing
Zi = (di + f(yi)) mod pi.
• The secret is reconstructed from the shares Zi of k or
more participants using CRT.
C. Example:
1) Distribution:
• Consider a publicly known (3, 5) Mignotte’s sequece to
be 5,7,11,13,17.
• Let the random values be y1 = 3, y2 = 4, y3 = 8, y4 =
5, y5 = 10 and the chosen one-way function be the
exponentiation of 2 modulo 17.
• Consider the secret as 297 which lies between β and α,
where β = 221 and α = 385.
• Compute Zi = S mod pi, 1 ≤ i ≤ 5.
Z1 = 297 mod 5 = 2, Z2 = 297 mod 7 = 3,
Z3 = 297 mod 11 = 0, Z4 = 297 mod 13 = 11,
Z5 = 297 mod 17 = 8.
• Compute shift values di = Zi−f(yi) mod pi,1 ≤ i ≤ 5.
d1 = (2 − 8) mod 5 = 4, d2 = (3 − 16) mod 7 = 1,
d3 = (0− 1) mod 11 = 10, d4 = (11− 15) mod 13 = 9,
d5 = (8− 4) mod 17 = 4.
These values are made public and yi, 1 ≤ i ≤ 5, are
privately delivered to the participants.
2) Reconstruction:
• Three particiapnts, say Z1, Z2, Z5, want to pool their
shares and reconstruct the secret. So they calculate their
actual shares by computing Zi = (di + f(yi)) mod pi
for i = 1, 2 and 5. That is
Z1 = (4 + 8) mod 5 = 2, Z2 = (1 + 16) mod 7 = 3,
and Z5 = (4 + 4) mod 17 = 8.
• The secret is reconstructed from the following equations
using CRT.
S ≡ 2 mod 5
S ≡ 3 mod 7
S ≡ 8 mod 17









= 35 and N1 = 4, N2 = 1, N3 = 1
where Ni, 1 ≤ i ≤ 3 are such m1N1 = 1 mod
5,m2N2 = 1 mod 7,m3N3 = 1 mod 17
Therefore, S = ((2∗119∗4)+(3∗85∗1)+(8∗35∗1)) mod
595 = 297
Hence the secret.
IV. PROPOSED MULTI-STAGE MULTI-SECRET SHARING
SCHEME BASED ON MIGNOTTE’S SEQUENCE
Overview of the scheme
As in the previous single secret scheme, here also the dealer
initializes all the required parameters. The only difference is
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that the dealer chooses multiple, say l, secrets Si, 1 ≤ i ≤ l,
instaead of a single secret. The chosen secrets Si, 1 ≤ i ≤ l,
are then modified to S′i = Si+Si+1, 1 ≤ i ≤ l−1, except the
last secret Sl, which remains as it is. Successful reconstruction
of the secrets is possible only when the secrets lie between
the values of β and α. So as to bring the modified secrets (i.e
S′i = Si+Si+1) to this range , we divide each of the modified
secret by 2. While doing so, we modify the secrets S′i by
subtracting 1 from the odd secrets and record this by setting a
flag bit bi. The resulting values are the final modified secrets
(S′′i ), from which the actual shares (Zij) of the participants are
generated. From the actual shares Zij , 1 ≤ i ≤ l, 1 ≤ j ≤ n,
and the pseudo shares y1, y2, · · · , yn public values dij are
computed. Verification values are also derived from the actual
shares. Both the sets, i.e the set of the public (di values) and
the the set of verification values are made public. The random
values (i.e pseudo shares y1, y2, · · · , yn) which were chosen
by the dealer are distributed privately to each participant. In
the verification phase, any participant can compute the hash
value by using verification function and check whether they
are equal to the published verification values.
In the reconstruction phase, participants compute their ac-
tual shares by adding the images of the one-way function of
their secret shadows to the public values. CRT is used to
reconstruct the modified secrets, which are then multiplied
by 2. Si−1 is then recovered by subtracting the previously
recostructed secret Si.
A. Initialization
In this phase, all the variables are intialized and the secrets
are chosen.
Algorithm 1 Initialization
1: Let {P1, P2, · · · , Pn} be the n paricipants and k be the
threshold value.
2: Consider a publicly known (k, n) Mignotte’s sequece, say
p1 < p2 < . . . < pn.
3: Randomly choose n secret shadows y1, y2, · · · , yn such
that yi ∈ Zpi as the pseudo shares.
4: Choose the secrets S1, S2, · · · , Sl such that β < Si < α,
1 ≤ i ≤ l , where α =
k∏
i=1





In the distribution phase, actual secret is modified except
the lth secret. Shares are computed from these modified
secrets.
Algorithm 2 Distribution of Shares
1: Compute S′i = Si + Si+1, for i = 1, 2, · · · , l − 1
2: For i = 1, 2, · · · , l − 1
Begin




i − 1)/2 and set
bi = 1
4: Else S′′i = S
′
i/2 and set bi = 0.
End.
5: S′′l = S
′
l = Sl
For i = 1, 2, · · · , l and j = 1, 2, · · · , n do
Begin
6: Compute Zij = S
′′
i mod pj
7: Compute dij = (Zij − f
i(yj)) mod pj , where f is a one
way function and f i(x) denotes i successive applications
of f to x. i.e f0(x) = x and f i(x) = f(f i−1(x)) for
i ≥ 1
8: Compute F (r, Zij), where r is a random value
End.
9: Distribute yj to each participant through a secure channel
and publish all dij , F (r, Zij) values, r and two-variable
one-way function F (r, z).
C. Verification
In this phase, each participant can verify the allocated
share. Reconstructor also can verify the shares provided by
the participants.
Algorithm 3 Verification of shares
1: Participants can verify their shares by calculating
F (r, Zij), where Zij itself can be computed by using
pseudo shares yj and the corresponding public values dij .
2: Similarly, reconstructor also can verify honesty of the
other participants by computing F (r, Zij).
D. Reconstruction
Secrets are reconstructed in seqiential order starting from
the last, i.e, the lth, secret. Any k or more participants can
pool their shares and reconstruct these secrets.
Algorithm 4 Reconstruction of secrets
1: Each participant j, 1 ≤ j ≤ n, willing to take part in the
reconstruction calculates Zij = (dij+f
i(yj)) mod pj ,1 ≤
i ≤ l
2: Any k participants can pool their shares and reconstruct
the secrets Sl, Sl−1, · · · , S1 in a sequential order as fol-
lows
3: If i = l, then construct S′′l = S
′
l and hence the secret Sl
using CRT from the shares Zlj
For i = l− 1, l − 2, · · · , 1 do the following:
4: Construct S′′i using CRT from the shares Zij
5: S′i = S
′′
i ∗ 2





7: Compute the ith secret as Si = S
′
i − Si+1
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E. Example
We hereby illustrate the proposed scheme with artificially
small parameters.
1) Initialization:
• Consider a group of 5 participants {P1, P2, P3, P4, P5}
wherein 3 participants are sufficient to reconstruct the
secret. That is the number of participants, n, is 5 and the
threshold, t, is 3.
• Consider the Mignotte’s sequece as 5,7,11,13,17 in which
β = 221 and α = 385.
• Let the random values be: y1 = 3, y2 = 4, y3 = 8, y4 =
5, y5 = 10.
• Consider the secrets to be S1 = 251, S2 = 282, S3 =
323, S4 = 317 which lie between β and α.
Let the chosen one way function be exponentiation of 2
modulo
2) Distribution:
• Compute S′i = Si + Si+1 for i = 1, 2, 3. That is
S′1 = S1 + S2 = 251 + 282 = 533
S′2 = S2 + S3 = 282 + 323 = 605
S′3 = S3 + S4 = 323 + 317 = 640
S′4 = S4 = 317.
• Check the condition (S′i mod 2 == 1) and correspond-
ingly compute S′′i ,
S′′1 = (533− 1)/2 = 266 and b1 = 1
S′′2 = (605− 1)/2 = 302 and b2 = 1




• Compute Zij = S
′′
i mod pj ,for i = 1, 2, 3, 4 and
j = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. This gives
Z11 = 1, Z12 = 0, Z13 = 2, Z14 = 6, Z15 = 11
Z21 = 2, Z22 = 1, Z23 = 5, Z24 = 3, Z25 = 13
Z31 = 0, Z32 = 5, Z33 = 1, Z34 = 8, Z35 = 14
Z41 = 2, Z42 = 2, Z43 = 9, Z44 = 5, Z45 = 11
• Compute public values dij = (Zij−f
i(yj)) mod pj, 1 ≤
i ≤ 4, 1 ≤ j ≤ 5
d11 = 3, d12 = 5, d13 = 1, d14 = 4, d15 = 7
d21 = 1, d22 = 0, d23 = 3, d24 = 7, d25 = 14
d31 = 3, d32 = 3, d33 = 8, d34 = 6, d35 = 13
d41 = 3, d42 = 5, d43 = 4, d44 = 1, d45 = 9
• yj , 1 ≤ j ≤ 5 values are delivered to each participant
through a secure channel and dij , 1 ≤ i ≤ 4, 1 ≤ j ≤ 5
values are published.
3) Reconstruction: Since the threshold is 3, let us assume
that the participants P1, P2 and P5 cooperate in the reconstruc-
tion procedure. So, they perform the following operations to
reconstruct the secret.
• Each particiapnt calculates his actual share for
secret Si i.e., the j
th participant calculates
Zij = (dij + f
i(yj)) mod pj . Also they know from the
public values that b1, b2 and b3 are 1,2, and 0 respectively.
• Construct the secret S4 by pooling shares Z41, Z42, Z45
and using CRT as follows:
We have M = 5 ∗ 7 ∗ 17 = 595, m1 = 119,m2 =
85,m3 = 35 and N1 = 4, N2 = 1, N3 = 1
Therefore, S4 = ((2 ∗ 119 ∗ 4) + (2 ∗ 85 ∗ 1) +
(11 ∗ 35 ∗ 1)) mod 595 = 317.




1 by pooling shares
(Z31, Z32, Z35), (Z21, Z22, Z25), (Z11, Z12, Z15)
respctively, we have,
S′′3 = ((0∗119∗4)+(5∗85∗1)+(14∗35∗1)) mod 595 =
320;
S′′2 = ((2∗119∗4)+(1∗85∗1)+(13∗35∗1)) mod 595 =
302; and
S′′1 = ((1∗119∗4)+(0∗85∗1)+(11∗35∗1)) mod 595 =
266




3 ∗ 2 = 640.




2 ∗ 2) + 1 = 605




1 ∗ 2) + 1 = 533.
• Construct secrets S3, S2, S1 sequentially by evaluating
the expression Si = S
′
i − Si+1 as follows:
S3 = S
′
3 − S4 = 640− 317 = 323
S2 = S
′
2 − S3 = 605− 323 = 282
S1 = S
′
1 − S2 = 533− 282 = 251
Hence the required secrets.
F. Correctness
In the following correctneess of the proposed multi-stage
multi-secret scheme is discussed.
Theorem The secrets can be reconstructed if and only if the
set of participants reconstructing the secrets is an authorized
set.
Proof
• Case 1: Sl reconstruction
As explained in the reconstruction, each participant Pj ,
1 ≤ j ≤ n can compute the actual share Zlj correspond-




l from dlj . Note that S
′′
l is




l = Sl and
β < Sl < α. Since α =
∏k
i=1 Pi and β =
∏k−2
i=0 Pn−i,
from the principle of CRT, any k or more participants
will be able to reconstruct S′′l = Sl where as any set of
atmost (k−1) participants will not be able to reconstruct
the same.
• Case 2: Reconstruction of remaining secrets
Following the same procedure explained in case 1, one





from which Sl−1 = S
′
l−1−Sl can be computed. Similarly
the other secrets can be recovered. Note that all this is
possible by an authorized set and not by an unauthorized
set. This is because the product of any k−1 primes is less
than or equal to β; whereas the secrets Si, 1 ≤ i ≤ l− 1
and hence S′′i lie in the interval (β, α).
V. IMPROVED MULTI-STAGE MULTI-SECRET SHARING
SCHEME BASED ON MIGNOTTE’S SEQUENCE
Note that the previous scheme uses flag bits, which are made
public, to keep track of whether the modified secrets are even
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or odd. This increases the number of public values by l − 1,
where l is the number of secrets. But the number of public
values is one of the parameters that determine the goodness
of a scheme; that is, lesser the number of public values of a
scheme better it is. Motivated by this observation, we hereby
propose an improved scheme for multi-secrets. Overview and
correctness of this scheme is similar to the previous one.
A. Distribution Phase
Algorithm 5 Distribution of Shares
1: For i = 1, 2, · · · , l and j = 1, 2, · · · , n do the following:
(i) Calculate Zij = Si mod pj .
2: For i = l and j = 1, 2, · · · , n do the following:
(i) Compute dlj = (Zlj − f
l(yj)) mod pj
3: For i = 1, 2, · · · , l − 1 and j = 1, 2, · · · , n do the
following:
(i) Compute dij = Zij ⊕ f
i(yj) ⊕ (Si+1 mod pj). That
is convert Zij , f
i(yj) and (Si+1 mod pj) to binary, exor
these binary values, and assign the resulting value to dij .
4: Compute F (r, Zij), where r is a random value
5: Distribute yj to each participant through a secure channel
and publish all dij , F (r, Zij) values, r and two-variable
one-way function F (r, z).
B. Reconstruction
Secrets are reconstructed in sequential order starting from
the lth, secret. Any k participants can pool their shares and
reconstruct these secrets.
Algorithm 6 Reconstruction of secrets
1: For i = l and j = 1, 2, · · · , n do the following
2: calculate Zlj = (dlj + f
l(yj)) mod pj .
3: For i = l − 1, l − 2, · · · , 1 and j = 1, 2, · · · , n do the
following :
4: calculate Zij = (dij ⊕ f
i(yj)⊕ (Si+1 mod pj)) .
5: Any k participants can pool their shares and reconstruct
the secrets Sl, Sl−1, · · · , S1 in a sequential order using
CRT from the shares Zij .
Note:Verification is same as in the previous schemes.
C. Example
Let the values of the parameters be as in the example of the
previous section.
1) Distribution: Only those steps that differ from the pre-
vious one are given. The difference is only in the calculation
of the true and public values of the secrets.
• Compute Zij = Si mod Pj for i = 1, 2, 3, 4 and
j = 1, 2, · · · , 5. This gives
Z11 = 1, Z12 = 6, Z13 = 9, Z14 = 4, Z15 = 13
Z21 = 2, Z22 = 2, Z23 = 7, Z24 = 9, Z25 = 10
Z31 = 3, Z32 = 1, Z33 = 4, Z34 = 11, Z35 = 0
Z41 = 2, Z42 = 2, Z43 = 9, Z44 = 5, Z45 = 11
• Compute public values dij = (Zij ⊕ f
i(yj) ⊕ (Si+1
mod Pj)), 1 ≤ i ≤ 3, 1 ≤ j ≤ 5
d11 = 11, d12 = 20, d13 = 15, d14 = 2, d15 = 3
d21 = 0, d22 = 2, d23 = 1, d24 = 11, d25 = 25
d31 = 3, d32 = 1, d33 = 9, d34 = 12, d35 = 10
• Calculate d4j = (Z4j − f
4(yj)) mod pj , 1 ≤ j ≤ 5
d41 = 3, d42 = 5, d43 = 4, d44 = 1, d45 = 9
• yj , 1 ≤ j ≤ 5 are given to each participant through a
secure channel and dij , 1 ≤ i ≤ 4, 1 ≤ j ≤ 5 values are
published.
2) Reconstruction: Assume that the participants P1, P2 and
P5 cooperate to reconstruct the secrets.
• Compute Z4j = (d4j + f
4(yj)) mod pj for j = 1, 2,
and 5
• Construct the secret S4 as 317 by pooling shares Z41 =
2, Z42 = 2, Z45 = 11 and using CRT
Compute Zij = (dij ⊕ f
i(yj) ⊕ (Si+1modpj)) for i =
3, 2, 1 and j = 1, 2, · · · , 5
Compute S3 as 323, S2 as 282, S1 as 251 by pooling
shares (Z31, Z32, Z35), (Z21, Z22, Z25), (Z11, Z12, Z15)
respectively.
D. Comparison
The comparison between the previous Multi-Stage Secret
sharing scheme and Improved Scheme is shown below.
VI. PROPOSED SINGLE SECRET SHARING SCHEME BASED
ON ASMUTH-BLOOM SEQUENCE
Overview of the scheme
Initially, the dealer comes up with the number of participants
(n), threshold value (k), the secret (S) to be shared among
the participants P1, P2, · · · , Pn, one way function (f), value
γ and Asmuth-Bloom sequence p0, p1, p2, · · · , pn to be used.
Also the delaer chooses random values yi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and
distributes them one each to the participants (i.e yi to Pi) as
the pseduo shares of the participants. The dealer modifies the
secret to X = S + γp0 and then computes the (real) shares
of the participants Pi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, from X . Now the dealer
applies the chosen one-way function f to each of these random
numbers (yi), subtracts each of these resulting numbers f(yi)
from the corresponding real shares Zi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n of the
participants and distribute the chosen random numbers yi
to the participants Pi. While reconstructing the secret, the
participants first apply one-way function to the pseudo share,
which they possess, adds the resulting value f(yi) to the
corresponding public share and recovers the actual shares, Zi.
These shares are then used to recover X using CRT, from
which the actual secret S is reconstructed.
A. Distribution
• Let the chosen (k, n) Asmuth-Bloom sequence be
p0, p1, p2, . . . , pn.
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TABLE I
COMPARISON
S.No Property Previous Scheme Improved Scheme
1 No. of Public values ln+ (l − 1) (ln)
2 Information Leak Leak information to intruders No information is leaked
3 Computionally Security Less secure More secure
• Choose y1, y2, · · · , yn such that yi ∈ Zpi as the pseudo
shares.
• Choose the secret S such that S ∈ Zp0
• Modify secret S to X = (S + γp0), where γ is an








• Compute shares Zi = X mod pi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
• Compute di = (Zi − f(yi)) mod pi as the shift values,
where f is the chosen one way function.
• For every i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, deliver yi to the i
th participant
through a secure channel and publish di
B. Reconstruction
• Each participant calculates his actual share by computing
Zi = (di + f(yi)) mod pi.
• The modified secret X is reconstructed from the shares
Zi of k participants using CRT.
• The original secret S is then reconstructed using S =
X mod p0
C. Example:
The proposed scheme is hereby illustrated with artificially
small parameters.
1) Distribution:
• Consider a publicly known (3, 4) Asmuth-Bloom
sequence. Let it be 3,11,13,17,19.
• Let the random values be: y1 = 3, y2 = 4, y3 = 8, y4 = 5
and the chosen one-way function be the exponentiation
of 2 modulo 17.
• Consider the secret as 2, as 2 ∈ Zp0
• We need to consider γ such that β < (S + γp0) < α
where β = p0
k−2∏
i=0




γ = 431 which gives X = (2 + 431 ∗ 3) = 1295
• Computing Zi = X mod pi.
Zi1 = 1295 mod 11 = 8, Zi2 = 1295 mod 13 = 8,
Zi3 = 1295 mod 17 = 3, Zi4 = 1295 mod 19 = 3
• Computing shift values by di = [Zi − f(yi)] mod pi.
d1 = (8 − 8) mod 11 = 0, d2 = (8 − 16) mod 13 = 5,
d3 = (3 − 1) mod 17 = 2, d4 = (3− 15) mod 19 = 7.
These values are made public and yi,i = 1, 2, · · · , n are
privately delivered to the participants.
2) Reconstruction:
• Any participant, say Z1, Z2, Z3 wants to pool their shares
and reconstruct the secret.
Hence they calculate their actual shares by Zi = (di +
f(yi)) mod pi.
Z1 = (0 + 8) mod 11 = 8,
Z2 = (5 + 16) mod 13 = 8, and
Z3 = (2 + 1) mod 17 = 3.
• The secret is reconstructed from the following equations
using CRT.
S ≡ 1 mod 11,
S ≡ 12 mod 13,
S ≡ 2 mod 17
We have M = 11∗13∗17 = 2431, M1 = 2431/11 = 221,
M2 = 187, M3 = 143
and N1 = 1,N2 = 8,N3 = 5
Therefore, X = [(8 ∗ 221 ∗ 1)+ (8 ∗ 187 ∗ 8)+ (3 ∗ 143 ∗
5)] mod 2431 = 1295
and the secret S = 1295 mod 3 = 2,
Hence the secret.
VII. PROPOSED MULTI-STAGE MULTI-SECRET SHARING
SCHEME BASED ON ASMUTH-BLOOM SEQUENCE
Overview of the scheme
The dealer initializes all the parameters and chooses the
required multiple secrets Si, 1 ≤ i ≤ l, as against the
single secret of the previous scheme. In the distribution
phase, the chosen secrets except the last are modified to S′i
by adding two consecutive secrets, i.e. S′i = Si + Si+1.
Successful reconstruction of the secrets is possible only when






Pi. So as to
bring the modified secrets (i.e S′i = Si + Si+1) to this
range, we divide the modified secrets by 2. The resulting
values are the new modified secrets (S′′i ). Again from these
modified secrets X values are computed, from which the actual
shares (Zij) of the participants are generated. From the actual
shares Zij , 1 ≤ i ≤ l, 1 ≤ j ≤ n, and the pseudo shares
y1, y2, · · · , yn public values are computed. Verification values
are also derived from the actual shares. Both the sets, i.e the set
of the public and the the set of the verification values are made
public. The random values (i.e. pseudo shares y1, y2, · · · , yn)
which were chosen by the dealer are distributed privately to
each participant. In the verification phase, any participant can
compute the hash value by using the verification function and
check whether they are equal to the published verification
values or not.
In the reconstruction phase, participants can compute their
actual shares by adding the images of the one-way function
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of their secret shadows to the public values. CRT is used to
reconstruct the X values, from which modified secrets are
computed and if the flag bit corresponding to the modified
secret is 1, then the modified secret is multiplied by 2 and 1
is added to it. Otherwise the modified secret is just multiplied
by 2. The actual secrets are then computed from these modified
secrets.
A. Initialization
In this phase, all the variables are intialized and the secrets
are chosen.
Algorithm 7 Initialization
1: Let {P1, P2, · · · , Pn} be the n participants and k be the
threshold value.
2: Consider a publicly known (k, n) Asmuth-Bloom se-
quence, say p0, p1, p2, . . . , pn.
3: Randomly choose n secret shadows y1, y2, · · · , yn such
that yi ∈ Zpi as the pseudo shares.
4: Choose the secrets S1, S2, · · · , Sl such that Si ∈ Zp0 ,
1 ≤ i ≤ l.
B. Distribution
In the distribution phase, actual secrets are modified except
the last. Shares are computed from these modified secrets.
Algorithm 8 Distribution of Shares
1: Compute S′i = Si + Si+1, for i = 1, 2, · · · , l− 1




i − 1)/2 and bi = 1,
for 1 ≤ i ≤ l − 1
Otherwise, S′′i = S
′
i/2 and bi = 0, for 1 ≤ i ≤ l − 1
3: S′′l = S
′
l = Sl
4: Xi = (S
′′
i +γp0), where γ is an arbitary integer such that







5: For i = 1, 2, · · · , l and j = 1, 2, · · · , n do
Begin
6: Compute Zij = Xi mod pj
7: Compute dij = (Zij − f
i(yj)) mod pj , where f is a one
way function and f i(x) denotes i successive applications
of f to x.
8: Compute F (r, Zij), where r is a random value
End
9: Distribute yj to each participant through a secure channel
and publish all dij , F (r, Zij) values, r and two-variable
one-way function F (r, z).
C. Verification
In this phase, each participant can verify the allocated
shares. Reconstructor also can verify the shares provided by
the participants.
Algorithm 9 Verification of shares
1: Participants can verify their shares by calculating
F (r, Zij), where Zij itself can be computed by using
pseudo shares and the corresponding public values.
2: Similarly, reconstructor also can verify honesty of the
other participants by computing F (r, Zij).
D. Reconstruction
Secrets are reconstructed in sequential order starting from
the last, i.e the lth secret. Any k participants can pool their
shares and reconstruct these secrets.
Algorithm 10 Reconstruction of secrets
1: Each participant j, 1 ≤ j ≤ n, willing to take part in the
reconstruction, calculates Zij = (dij + f
i(yj)) mod pj ,
1 ≤ i ≤ l
Case 1: If i = l
2: Construct Xl value from corresponding shares Zlj using
CRT.




l = (Xl mod p0)
Case 2: For i = l − 1, l− 2, · · · , 1 do the following:
4: Construct Xi using CRT from the shares Zij
5: Construct S′′i = Xi mod p0
6: S′i = S
′′
i ∗ 2









We hereby illustrate the proposed scheme with artificially
small parameters.
1) Initialization:
• Consider a group of 5 participants {P1, P2, P3, P4, P5}
wherein 3 participants are sufficient to reconstruct the
secret. That is the number of participants, n, is 5 and the
threshold, k, is 3.
• Consider the Asmuth-Bloom sequence as
8,17,23,29,31,37 (where p0 = 8)
• Let the random values be: y1 = 6, y2 = 13, y3 = 24, y4 =
29, y5 = 35 and one-way function f(x) = 2
x mod 43
• Consider the secrets to be S1 = 2, S2 = 3, S3 = 5, S4 =
7 which lie in Zp0 .
2) Distribution:







4 as 5, 8, 12and7 respectively.
• Check the condition (S′i mod 2 == 1) and correspond-
ingly compute S′′i ,
S′′1 = (5− 1)/2 = 2 and b1 = 1
S′′2 = 8/2 = 4 and b2 = 0




• Compute Xi = (S
′′
i + γp0), consider γ = 1200 as







Therefore, X1 = 9602, X2 = 9604, X3 = 9606, X4 =
9607
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TABLE II
COMPARISON OF EXISTING AND PROPOSED SCHEMES
S.No Scheme Multi-Secret Reusable No.of public values Sequence used
1 Mignotte Scheme(existing) Single No No pulic values Mignotte Sequence
2 Asmuth-Bloom Scheme(existing) Single No No pulic values Asmuth-Bloom Sequence
3 Reusable Single Secret Sharing Scheme I Single No No pulic values Mignotte Sequence
4 Proposed Multi-Stage Multi-Secret Sharing Scheme I Multi Yes ln+(l-1) Mignotte Sequence
5 Improved Multi-Stage Multi-Secret Sharing Scheme Multi Yes ln Mignotte Sequence
6 Reusable Single Secret Sharing Scheme II Single Yes No public values Asmuth-Bloom Sequence
7 Proposed Multi-Stage Multi-Secret Sharing Scheme II Multi Yes ln+(l-1) Asmuth-Bloom Sequence
• Compute Zij = Xi mod pj , for i = 1, 2, 3, 4 and
j = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. This gives
Z11 = 14, Z12 = 11, Z13 = 3, Z14 = 23, Z15 = 19
Z21 = 16, Z22 = 13, Z23 = 5, Z24 = 25, Z25 = 21
Z31 = 1, Z32 = 15, Z33 = 7, Z34 = 27, Z35 = 23
Z41 = 2, Z42 = 16, Z43 = 8, Z44 = 28, Z45 = 24
• Compute public values dij = (Zij−F
i(yj)) mod pj, 1 ≤
i ≤ 4, 1 ≤ j ≤ 5
d11 = 10, d12 = 12, d13 = 26, d14 = 21, d15 = 14
d21 = 8, d22 = 18, d23 = 21, d24 = 21, d25 = 20
d31 = 0, d32 = 16, d33 = 6, d34 = 11, d35 = 21
d41 = 0, d42 = 21, d43 = 6, d44 = 4, d45 = 20
• yj , 1 ≤ j ≤ 5 values are delivered to each participant
through a secure channel and dij , 1 ≤ i ≤ 4, 1 ≤ j ≤ 5
values are published.
3) Reconstruction: Since the threshold is 3, let us assume
that the participants P1, P2 and P5 cooperate in the reconstruc-
tion procedure. So, they perform the following operations to
reconstruct the secret.
• Each participant calculates his actual share
for secret Si i.e. the j
th participant calculates
Zij = (dij + f
i(yj)) mod pj . Also they know public
values b1, b2 and b3 i.e. 1,0 and 0 respectively.
• Construct the value X4 by pooling shares Z41, Z42, Z45
and using CRT as follows:











and N1 = 1, N2 = 3, N3 = 30
Therefore, S4 = ((2 ∗ 851 ∗ 1) + (16 ∗ 629 ∗ 3) +
(24 ∗ 391 ∗ 30)) mod 14467 = 9607.
• Now calculate secret S4 as S4 = X4 mod p0 so that
S4 = 9607 mod 8 = 7, Hence the secret S4
• Compute X3, X2, X1 by pooling shares
(Z31, Z32, Z35), (Z21, Z22, Z25), (Z11, Z12, Z15)
respectively. Therefore,
X3 = ((1∗851∗1)+(15∗629∗3)+(29∗391∗30)) mod
14467 = 9606
X2 = ((16∗851∗1)+(13∗629∗3)+(21∗391∗30)) mod
14467 = 9604
X1 = ((14∗851∗1)+(11∗629∗3)+(19∗391∗30)) mod
14467 = 9602





S′′3 = X3 mod p0 = 9606 mod 8 = 6
S′′2 = X2 mod p0 = 9604 mod 8 = 4
S′′1 = X1 mod p0 = 9602 mod 8 = 2




3 ∗ 2 = 12




2 ∗ 2) = 8




1 ∗ 2) + 1 = 5
• Construct secrets S3, S2, S1 sequentially using the ex-
pression Si = S
′
i − Si+1 and arrive at
S3 = S
′
3 − S4 = 12− 7 = 5
S2 = S
′
2 − S3 = 8− 5 = 3
S1 = S
′
1 − S2 = 5− 3 = 2
Hence the required secrets.
F. Correctness
Correctness of the scheme is same as the one given in
section 4 except that X values replace S′′ values and that
Si = Xi mod p0 for 1 ≤ i ≤ l.
VIII. OUR RESULTS
Three Schemes that use the Mignotte’s Sequence and then
two Schemes that use the Asmuth-Bloom Sequence proposed
by this paper. The first and the fourth Schemes are designed
for single secret; whereas the remaining three Schemes are
designed for multiple secrets. Among the proposed Schemes,
third Scheme is an improvement over the Second one in the
sense that it reduces the number of required public values.
Also discussed in the paper is the correctness of the schemes.
Novelty of our schemes, in contrast to the existing schemes is
that the shares are reusable. Table II represents the comparative
analysis of existing schemes (Mignotte and Asmuth-Bloom)
and proposed schemes.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have proposed three secret sharing schemes
that use the Mignotte’s sequence and two secret sharing
schemes that use the Asmuth-Bloom sequence. All these
five secret sharing schemes are based on Chinese Remainder
Theorem (CRT). The first scheme that uses the Mignotte’s
sequence is a single secret scheme. It is extended to the
multi-stage multi-secrets in the second scheme, which is later
improved to result in a third scheme. The first scheme that
uses the Asmuth-Bloom sequence is designed for the case of
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a single secret and the second one is an extension of the first
scheme to the case of multi-secrets. A novel feature of our
schemes is that the shares of the participants are reusable, i.e,
same shares can be used even with a new set of secrets. It also
checks the dealer participant’s honesty. This feature finds its
use if the dealer distributes fake shares to the participants or
a participant may provide a fake share to other participants in
reconstruction. Correctness of the scheme is also discussed.
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